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In this paper I investigate to what extent ﬁrm-speciﬁcu n c e r t a i n t ya f -
fects the gain from indexation. Earlier studies have tried to explain wage
rigidity by arguing that insiders face little layoﬀ risk due to employment
ﬂuctuations caused by aggregate shocks. However, this analysis abstracts
from idiosyncratic risk and this seems hard to reconcile with recent micro-
economic evidence which shows that ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty explains a
large part of establishments’ employment changes. By numerically solv-
ing an insider-outsider model I show that the introduction of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
uncertainty increases the gain from indexation considerably (from 0 to 1.5
percent of the wage). It is not evident that the gain from indexation is
small enough to support an equilibrium with a constant nominal wage.
According to the model, nominal wage contracts should be more preva-
lent, when layoﬀ is not so costly for the worker, due to high unemployment
beneﬁts or short duration of unemployment spells.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Most labor markets cannot be adequately described as spot markets. Contracts
seem to play an important role.1 One role for contracts is to enable employees to
share the risks from uncertain income streams with their employers.
Baily (1974) and Azariadis (1975) show that a risk-averse worker would be
willing to buy insurance from the employer by agreeing to a ﬁxed wage contract.
The gain for the employer is that he could obtain a given amount of labor at a
lower expected cost. Gottfries (1992) modiﬁes the labor contract model of Baily
and Azariadis in two ways. First, the focus on the source of employment vari-
ations is shifted from layoﬀs to hiring. Second, the wage of currently employed
workers (insiders) is tied to the wage oﬀered to newly hired workers (outsiders).
The main result is that a small cost for writing a state-contingent contract is suﬃ-
cient to support an equilibrium with ﬁxed nominal wages. Hence, it is diﬃcult to
construct a simple indexed contract that is superior to a contract which stipulates
a certain nominal wage. The intuition is that if the rate of inﬂation is low and
stable, nominal wage contracts imply relatively stable and predictable real wages.
Demand and supply shocks aﬀect employment, but since these shocks mainly af-
fect the hiring of outsiders, they are of little concern to the insiders. From the
1Using individual data from the Current Population Survey and the Panel of Income Dy-
namics, Beaudry & DiNardo (1991) ﬁnd that an implicit contract model describe the links
between wages and labor market conditions better than a spot market model. McDonald &
Worswick (1999) provide further evidence on the importance of implicit contracts: ”Our re-
sults suggests that the importance of macroeconomic conditions on wages operating through
implicit contracts may be a general charactristic of developed economies and so is worth further
examination.”
2point of view of ﬁrms and insiders, nominal wage contracts may therefore be
preferable.
This result hinges on the assumption that the currently employed workers
face a high degree of job security. Job security for insiders follows from the
assumptions that all employment adjustment take the form of ﬂuctuations in
hiring and that the wage oﬀered to newly hired workers is tied to the wage of
insiders.2
The assumption that variation in hiring is the main determinant of employ-
ment ﬂuctuations seems hard to reconcile with the recent literature on job cre-
ation and job destruction. Microeconomic evidence from most OECD countries
shows that job creation and job destruction occur simultaneously at all phases
of the business cycle. Common among these studies is that a large part of es-
tablishments’ employment experiences seems to be explained by idiosyncratic or
ﬁrm-speciﬁc sources of uncertainty.3 Davis, Haltiwanger & Schuh (1997) argue
that a likely reason for heterogeneity in plant-level outcomes is uncertainty about
the demand for new products. This uncertainty will in turn encourage the ﬁrm
to experiment with diﬀerent technologies and production facilities. Hence, the
measurement of job creation and job destruction for the manufacturing sector
2If there is no limit on the wage dispersion ﬁrms get a strong incetive to replace expensive
inside workers with cheaper outside workers. Insiders would in this case have a low degree of
job security.
3If aggregate shocks predominate then it follows that the correlation between job creation
and job destruction is close to −1. The actual correlation is −0.36. We would also observe
a variance ratio (destruction to creation) close to 1. The actual ratio is 3.4. See Davis &
Haltiwanger (1999) for a survey of recent research on job creation and destruction.
3casts new light on labor market dynamics. At the same time, the very nature
of ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks seems to be such that it is very hard to make wages or
employment contingent on them. These costs may originate from veriﬁcation
problems. The reasons for the heterogeneity in plant-level outcomes ought to be
very diﬃcult to assess and verify.4
In view of this it is interesting to explore to what extent idiosyncratic or ﬁrm-
speciﬁc sources of uncertainty aﬀect the gain from indexation, or equivalently,
the gain from writing state contingent wage contracts. In this paper I modify the
model developed in Gottfries (1992) to investigate to what extent ﬁrm-speciﬁc
sources of uncertainty aﬀect the gain from indexation. The main diﬀerence from
that model is that I let demand be aﬀected by aggregate as well as idiosyncratic
factors. I also let the productivity shocks be ﬁrm-speciﬁc. A recession, caused
e.g. by an adverse monetary shock, aﬀects all ﬁrms. The eﬀects of the recession
may however be mitigated or reinforced by demand or supply conditions that
are speciﬁct ot h eﬁrm. I assume that these ﬁrm-speciﬁc sources of uncertainty
cannot be written into the contract, due to costs for writing and enforcing such
clauses.
Hence, Gottfries’ assumption that workers face a high degree of job security
is mitigated when I allow for ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty. The main result is that
4There exists several reasons for contractual incompleteness, e.g. unforseen contingencies,
writing costs, enforcement costs, environmental complexity, and renegotiation. These types of
”transaction costs” are discussed in Tirole (1999) and Segal (1999). The ”transaction costs”
prevent some aspects of future trade from being contracted ex ante, while allowing the parties
to contract on these aspects ex post.
4the introduction of ﬁrm-speciﬁc demand and supply uncertainty increases the
gain from indexation considerably for most parameter values. The gain is higher
for supply shocks. According to the model, nominal wage contracts should be
more prevalent, when layoﬀ is not so costly for the worker, e.g. due to high
unemployment beneﬁts or short duration of unemployment spells.
The model is presented in section 2. The numerical analysis and the results
are presented in section 3.S e c t i o n4 contains a sensitivity analysis and section 5
concludes.
2T h e M o d e l
As in Gottfries (1992) the economy is populated by a large number of entrepreneurs/
ﬁrms, indexed i, and a large number of workers. The sequence of events is the
following (see ﬁgure 1). At the beginning of a period a fraction, s,o ft h ew o r k e r s
quit for exogenous reasons. Firms write binding wage contracts with the remain-
ing workers, who are assumed to be identical in talents and preferences. Hence, if
a ﬁrm employed `−1 workers in the previous period it would enter the current pe-
riod with n =( 1− s)`−1 workers employed. Then the stochastic demand shocks,
aggregate money supply, m ∈ M, and idiosyncratic demand, zi ∈ Z,o ri d i o s y n -
cratic productivity, θi ∈ Θ, are observed by ﬁrms. In order to disentangle the
eﬀects of ﬁrm-speciﬁc sources of uncertainty on the gain from writing state con-
tingent wage contracts I will separate the analysis into two parts, one where ﬁrm-
5speciﬁc productivity is held constant, and the other where ﬁrm-speciﬁcd e m a n d
is held constant. The ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks are denoted xi ∈ X,w h e r exi equals
θi ∈ Θ or zi ∈ Z, depending on which shock is held constant. The aggregate and
idiosyncratic shocks have the joint density function f (m,xi).T h e ﬁrm-speciﬁc
shocks are assumed to be uncorrelated and independently distributed. Having
observed these shocks, ﬁrms hire workers and set prices. Finally goods markets
open, production takes place and wages are paid.
A contract between the ﬁrm and the worker may specify the insider wage,
the wage paid to newly hired outsiders, and employment as a function of the
shocks. As is common in most of the analysis of wage bargaining, I will rely
on the ”right-to-manage” assumption, i.e. that ﬁrms and workers bargain about
wages, but not about employment.5 Private unemployment insurance is unusual.
This is probably due to the diﬃculty for a ﬁrm to monitor whether a worker gets
another job. Moreover, the size of the payments are generally small. Thus, the
contract speciﬁes a wage payment wi (m) to the insiders who are instructed to
work for each possible outcome of m.
I also assume that it is not possible to make the contract contingent on the
idiosyncratic shocks. The absence of such contingencies may be explained by
costs for writing and enforcing such clauses. These costs may e.g. originate from
measurement problems and asymmetric information. A key idea in the literature
5See e.g. Oswald (1985) and Oswald (1986) or Layard, Nickell & Jackman (1997) for a
discussion.
6on mechanism design, which has inﬂuenced the literature on labor contracts, is
that contracts can only be contingent on measures that are veriﬁable.6 Malcom-
son (1997) notes that some information obviously can be made veriﬁable at a
cost. It may however not be worth doing so if an incomplete contract can in-
duce the contracting parties to behave suﬃciently close to what is eﬃcient. The
”right-to-manage” assumption means that the ﬁrm is allowed to choose the price
and production to maximize proﬁts, given the wage that is speciﬁed in the con-
tract.7 Thus, to analyze the model I start with the ﬁrm’s pricing and employment
decision.
Pricing
Production occurs under constant returns to scale with labor as the only
input: qi = θi`,w h e r eθi denotes ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity. The demand curve








, η < −1, (1)
where p is the aggregate price level and η is the price elasticity.8 The price
and sales (production) of ﬁrm i are denoted pi and qi.T h e m a i n d i ﬀerence
6See e.g. Hall (1998).
7The analysis follows Gottfries & Westermark (1998).
8κ is a normalization included in order to simplify the analysis. κ is deﬁned below.
7from the model developed by Gottfries (1992) is that there are two sources of
uncertainty, an aggregate and a idiosyncratic part that show up multiplicatively














The wage of insiders is denoted, wi.9 The entrepreneur who owns the ﬁrm
is risk averse and has a concave utility function Ψ(Π).10 Maximization of (2)



















9The distinction between insiders and outsiders will be made clear in the next subsection.
10It is often assumed that ﬁrms are risk neutral. If company owners hold well diversiﬁed
portfolios, ﬂuctuations in the wealth of one company should have little impact on investors’ ﬁ-
nancial state. Bewley (1999) argues that risk neutrality probably is invalid since even large ﬁrms
sacriﬁce future earnings to obtain cash when in ﬁnancial distress. Moreover, risk management









where A = − 1
1+η > 0.11
The Optimal State-Contingent Wage Contract
A worker can be in two states, employed or unemployed. The worker is an
insider if he was employed by a ﬁrm at the start of the period and an outsider if
he was unemployed. Insiders could be organized in a union that bargains with the
ﬁrm, but we may also think of the contract as being chosen by the ﬁrm. I assume
that wages of insiders and outsiders who are hired must be equal.12 Insiders
who are laid oﬀ receive unemployment compensation, b,w h i c hi sa s s u m e dt ob e
exogenous. Let the utility obtained by an insider in ﬁrm i be an increasing and






I do not specify the exact bargaining situation. Such a speciﬁcation is not
necessary since I am not concerned with the determinants of the level of the wage
(or employment). I do assume that the resulting contract is Pareto-optimal from
11There is, according to Blanchard & Fischer (1989) p. 464, substantial evidence that ﬁrms,
given wages, react to shifts in demand mostly by increasing quantities rather than by increasing
prices.
12See Gottfries & Sjöström (2000) for a discussion on such a constraint.
13U0 > 0, U00 < 0.W h e r eU0 and U00 denote ﬁrst- and second-order derivatives with respect
to real wage.
9the contracting parties’ point of view. The design of a Pareto-optimal contract
proceeds by maximizing one of the contracting party’s expected utility subject to
the other party receiving a reservation utility level. Which party’s utility level is
taken as a constraint does not matter in the analysis. Let ¯ U denote the workers’
ex ante reservation utility level. To show that there can be an equilibrium with
nominal wage contracts Gottfries (1992) analyses the optimal contract for an
individual ﬁrm, assuming that all unions have contracts with a ﬁxed nominal
wage, w∗. I use the same approach which implies that equation (3) can be
rewritten as p = w∗
θκ. Aggregate productivity is denoted, θ, and is assumed to be
constant. Hence, the equilibrium will be a coordinated equilibrium.14 For a wage
contract, wi (m), to be Pareto-optimal it must solve the following maximization
problem
14Gottfries (1992) explains this by noting that indexation or nonindexation are social customs



















+( 1− ϕ(wi,m,x i))U (b)
¸
f (m,xi)dmdxi ≥ ¯ U
(7)





indicates whether the insiders face a
risk of being laid oﬀ or not. Hence, work or nonwork assignments are drawn by
lot.15 We see that the utility of outsiders, U (b), are only a concern to the union
if some of its current members face a risk of being laid oﬀ,i . e . i fd e m a n di s
low enough to generate a level of employment that falls short of the number of
insiders.
I let the utility functions of the entrepreneur and the worker be of the constant
relative risk aversion class
15This assumption is done in order to keep things straight and to rule out the alternative



















respectively.16 The relative risk aversion of the entrepreneur and the worker
are denoted γ ≤− 1 and ρ < −1. Setting up the Lagrangean function, using (8)


































































w h e r ew ed e ﬁne the indicator function I (wi,m,x i)=0if
`(wi,m,zi)














when ρ = −1.
121 otherwise.17 The Lagrange multiplier, φ, is a weight that corresponds to the
relative bargaining power of the parties.
The ﬁrst term shows the eﬀect of a marginal increase in the wage on the utility
of the entrepreneur. The second and third term shows the marginal utility for
t h ew o r k e r .T h es e c o n dt e r ms h o w st h ee ﬀect of a marginal change in the wage
on the workers utility given that he gets to keep his job. The last term shows
the marginal eﬀect of a change in the wage on the probability for a worker to
be unmployed multiplied with the loss in utility that job loss is associated with.
Note that a marginal increase in the wage increases the workers’ probability of
being laid oﬀ. Furthermore, from this condition it is easy to see the eﬀects of
insurance, or more speciﬁcally that the optimal wage contract is independent
of the realization of the aggregate demand shock, m, when entrepreneurs have
logarithmic utility functions and when I (wi,m,x i)=0 .
However, the contract will in general be state contingent. Thus the question
is not whether a state contingent contract is optimal but how large is the gain of
a complicated state contingent contract compared with a simple contract with a
ﬁxed wage.
Further analysis of the optimal wage contract requires the use of numerical
methods. This is due to the inclusion of the idiosyncratic shock which adds some
complexity to the analysis.
17Since m and xi are independent we can write f (m,xi)=g (m)h(xi). T h i si m p l i e st h a t
we can divide the ﬁrst order condition by g(m).
13The Gain from Indexation
In this section I compare the state contingent contract with a contract that
stipulates a ﬁxed nominal wage. The best we can do, in general, is to compare the
indirect expected utility that the contracts give rise to. It is however more conve-
nient to have monetary measures of the change in utility. I deﬁne the gain from
indexation, c, as the amount of money that has to be deducted from the optimal
state contingent wage and unemployment compensation in order to make the in-
direct expected utility of the ﬁrm and the worker under this contract equivalent
to a contract with a constant nominal wage.18 Hence, the gain from indexation is
measured as the decrease in income that would give the same decrease in the in-
direct expected utility for the ﬁrm and the worker, Ωindex,( d e ﬁned below) as the
introduction of a ﬁxed nominal wage.19 This is done as follows: First, I calculate
the optimal constant wage, ¯ wi, i.e. solve the following ﬁrst order condition
18c can also be thought of as the required cost of indexation, i.e. cost that is required to
prevent indexation.
19An equivalent way of deﬁning the gain from indexation would be to add c to the ﬁxed wage.







































































f (m,xi)dmdxi =0 .
Second, I calculate the indirect expected utility for the ﬁrm and the worker
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i is the optimal constant wage. Third, I do the same as in the ﬁrst
stage but this time I solve for the state contingent (indexed) wage, i.e. solve
equation (10). Fourth, I calculate the indirect expected utility with the optimal
state contingent wage, wo
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.T h el a s t s t e p i s
to set c so as to make Ωfix = Ωindex. Hence, the gain from indexation, c,i st h e
gain that the worker has to give up to be equally well oﬀ with a state contingent
wage as with a ﬁxed wage.20 A constant nominal wage is thus an equilibrium if,
when all other ﬁrms hold their prices ﬁxed, the maximum gain to a worker from
a state-contingent wage is less than the cost of such a contract.
This argument is very similar to the one put forward by Akerlof & Yellen
(1985) and Mankiw (1985), namely that inertia in the wage-price behavior by
ﬁrms may not be very costly. In Akerlof & Yellen (1985) this behavior is said
to be near-rational. Near-rational behavior is, according to Akerlof & Yellen
(1985), behavior that is perhaps suboptimal but that nevertheless imposes very
small individual losses on its practitioners relative to the consequences of their
ﬁrst-best policy.
20The gain from indexation is assumed to aﬀect the worker since it is more intuitive to express
the gain from indexation as a percentage of the wage rather than as a percentage of the proﬁt.
163 Numerical Analysis
The parameter values are set as follows. The number of employed workers in the
previous period, `−1, is normalized to 1. Akerlof, Rose & Yellen (1988) report
monthly quit rates for the United States of about 2 percent. Similar ﬁgures for
the manufacturing sector in Sweden and United States have been reported by
Holmlund (1984).21 Is e tt h eq u i tr a t e ,s,t o0.2. This is reasonable since we
interpret a contract period in this model to be about a year. Hence, the ﬁrm
enters the current period with 0.8 workers employed.
The relative risk aversion of the ﬁrm, γ,a n dt h ew o r k e r ,ρ,a r ed i ﬃcult to
assess. Common measures for individuals, include 2−3 of Friend & Blume (1975)
and 1 − 10 of Haubrich (1994).22 I will in view of this, and since entrepreneurs
probably are less risk averse than workers, in the baseline case, assume that γ
equals −1 and that ρ equals −2.
If the price elasticity, η, is set to −2, we get a mark-up factor of 2.T h i sm a y
21Akerlof et al. (1988) report quit rates for the period 1948-1991 while Holmlund (1984) only
covers 1971-1975.
22Note that measures of relative risk aversion exceeding 25 also have been reported (such as
the 29 of Kandel & Stambaugh (1991)). Relative risk aversion equal to 25 implies, according
to Romer (1996) (p. 332), that individuals prefer a 17 percent reduction in consumption with
certainty to a one-in-two chance of a 20 percent reduction. This suggests that risk aversion is
much lower than this. As an example, that draws on Carlson (1998), of how much of a favourable
gamble a risk-averse worker (or entrepreneur) will take, suppose the worker is confronted with
the following situation. The worker can participate in a bet and either win x with probability
ε or lose x with probability 1 − ε. We can determine the size of the bet that the worker will
undertake by choosing x to maximize expected utility: εU (w + x)+( 1− ε)U (w − x).T h e






where r =( 1− ε)/ε.
If ε =0 .51 and ρ = −3 then w/x =1 5 0which implies that the worker is willing to risk 2/3 of
one per cent of the available wage. Romer (1996) (p. 335) views a coeﬃcient of 4 as being on
the high end of values that are plausible.
17seem a bit high, but is well within the range (1.5−3) which, according to Andersen
(1994), holds for most industries in the United states. Moreover, Rotemberg &
Woodford (1995) argue that there is great uncertainty about actual markups in
U.S. industry.
Unemployment compensation, b,i ss e tt o0.6.B e n e ﬁt rates varies quite a lot
between countries. Blanchard & Wolfers (1999) report replacement rates from 11
percent for Italy to 90 percent for Denmark. The level chosen here is supposed
to capture an American level (50 percent) somewhere between the two extreme
cases. I have set unemployment compensation slightly higher than 0.5 because
individuals generally have several possible ways to smooth variation in earnings
that arises from unemployment. Moreover, unemployment spells are on average
s h o r t e rt h a nay e a rw h i c hw ea l s oh a v et ot a k ei n t oa c c o u n t .
Aggregate productivity, θ, is set equal to 1. The aggregate and idiosyncratic
shocks, m and xi, are assumed to be uncorrelated, normally distributed with
mean equal to 1. The literature on job creation and job destruction gives a
hint on the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shock. Figure 2 depicts the
standard deviation of plant-level growth rates in employment, standardized by
ﬁrm size, for Swedish manufacturing ﬁrms between 1972 and 1996.23 Davis &
23The standard deviation is calculated as follows. Let `ist denote the number of workers at
employer i in sector s at time t. St denotes the set of employers with positive employment in
t or in t − 1. The size of an establishment at time t is measured as the simple average of its
employment in t − 1 and t, Zist = 1
2 (`ist + `is,t−1). Zst =
P
i∈St
Zist denotes the size of sector
s in period t.T h et i m e - t growth rate for employer i can be written gist =
`ist−`is,t−1
Zist .T h e s e
growth rates lie on the closed interval [−2,2]. The endpoints correspond to exit and entry. The
18Haltiwanger (1999) (p. 100) report a standard deviation of 0.36 for 1978 and 0.41
for 1982 for the United States. These measures are somewhat higher than what
is shown in ﬁgure 2, but are not standardized by plant size. In order to assess the
importance of the size weighting I have calculated growth rates in employment for
Swedish manufacturing ﬁrms without standardizing by plant size. The standard
d e v i a t i o ni si nt h i sc a s e0.42 for 1978 and 0.41 for 1982,w i t ham e a no f0.46 for
the period 1972−1996. In view of this I have chosen a standard deviation of the
idiosyncratic shocks ,σxi,t oe q u a l0.2.
The standard deviation of the aggregate demand shock, σm,i ss e tt o0.05.24
Ramey & Ramey (1995) report that the standard deviation of the growth rate
in GDP for the period 1960 to 1985 in the U.S. is 0.0259. According to Davis
et al. (1997) (p. 19), the standard deviation of net employment growth in the
U.S. manufacturing industry is 0.048.H e n c e ,0.05 is fairly well in line with these
observations. Table 1 summarizes the parameter values.
Table 1. Baseline Parameter Values
`−1 s γρηb θσ xi σm
10 .2 −1 −2 −20 .610 .20 .05







|gist|. The idiosyncratic growth rates













. See e.g. Davis & Haltiwanger (1999) for a more detailed
description of these measures.
24Gottfries (1992) uses the same value.
19In order to clarify the logic of the model, we ﬁrst consider the case where the
ﬁrm is only subject to aggregate demand shocks.
Aggregate Demand Shocks
This case is similar to Gottfries (1992) and will serve as a baseline case which
we can refer to and compare with when we introduce idiosyncratic shocks. The
analysis here is diﬀerent in that I allow for states where the aggregate demand is
so low that there may be layoﬀs. The ﬁrst order condition is given by












































By varying the weight φ, we describe the set of optimal contracts. Which one
is chosen depends on the bargaining power of the worker and the ﬁrm. The bar-
gaining power will depend on all the parameters in the model. I have throughout
the analysis set φ so as to mimic a ﬁctive steady state where the expected value
of the number of currently employed workers equals 1, E [`]=1 , so the previous
employed insiders corresponds to 80 percent of expected employment. This way
the model mimics a quit rate of 20 percent.
Figure 3 depicts the optimal state contingent wage contract, employment and
20proﬁt as functions of the aggregate demand shock.25 We conﬁrm the result in
Gottfries (1992) that the optimal nominal wage is independent of the demand
shock when γ = −1, and if the state is favourable. Workers prefer a constant
nominal wage to one that varies with demand as long as prices do not vary
with demand. The assumptions of constant returns and constant elasticity are
crucial to this result. This case is similar to the standard insurance result that
risk averse people are completely insured when premiums are actuarially fair26.
Moreover, we see that the demand shock must be suﬃciently limited for this to
hold (above 0.8). In less favourable states (m<0.8) the worker has to weigh a
higher wage against a higher probability of being laid oﬀ.T or e m a i ne m p l o y e di n
less favourable times, workers agree to sign a contract where the wages decrease.
In the interval (0.5 − 0.8) this decrease is set exactly so that all insiders remain
employed.27 The increase in marginal wage for a worker is higher in favourable
states because a marginal increase in the wage does not aﬀect the probability of
being laid oﬀ in these states.
One should notice that these results hinge on the assumed level of risk aversion
for the ﬁrm. If the ﬁrm is more risk averse, the wage should depend on the
aggregate demand shock, so that the worker will absorb some of the risk.
Indexation is, in this case, not associated with any gain (c =0 ) ,i . e . t h e
25Price, p, is set equal to 1. This is only a normalization and does not aﬀect the results.
See the appendix for the technical details of solving the non-linear ﬁrst order condition.
26See Rosen (1985).




η p, which gives
`(wi,m,1)
n =1 .
21worker does not gain anything from making his wage contingent on aggregate
demand. The gain from indexation is identical to Gottfries (1992) and is probably
suﬃciently small to support an equilibrium with nominal wage contracts. A price
level independent of demand together with a high degree of job security (states
where m<0.8 are very unlikely) makes insiders prefer a ﬁxed nominal wage to a
more complicated wage structure, i.e. a wage that is indexed to demand. Firms
may also prefer a ﬁxed nominal wage if they are not very risk averse.
Aggregate and Firm-Speciﬁc Demand Shocks
With both aggregate and ﬁrm-speciﬁcd e m a n ds h o c k sw ea r eb a c kw i t ht h e
original ﬁrst order condition (10). Figure 4 depicts the optimal wage contract,
employment and proﬁtw i t hﬁrm-speciﬁcs h o c k s ,σzi =0 .2.28
The most striking diﬀerence between the nominal wage contracts with σzi =
0.2 and those with σzi =0is that the nominal wage is no longer independent of
m around E [m]. Adding another source of uncertainty that cannot be written
into the contract naturally makes the workers worry about being laid oﬀ even
if the aggregate shocks are relatively favourable. Facing this extra source of
uncertainty, the ﬁrm and the worker agree on a contract that makes the nominal
wage dependent on the aggregate demand shock. Aggregate demand has to be
approximately greater than 1.7 for the nominal wage to be constant.
Employment is diﬀerent in that it varies more smoothly with demand and
28In this subsection σθi is set equal to 0.
22does not level out for intermediate levels of aggregate demand.
The gain from indexation is in this case considerably higher compared with
t h ec a s ew h e r eσzi =0 . The gain from indexation, c,i s0.015 which corresponds
to 1.5 p e r c e n to ft h ew a g e .I ti sd i ﬃcult to assess if this increase still is suﬃciently
small to support an equilibrium with nominal wage contracts.
In order to clarify the logic of this result it is convenient to consider a situation
where the ﬁrm-speciﬁc demand shocks can take only two values, either a low
level, zl
i, or a high level, zh
i .F i g u r e5 depicts the optimal state contingent wage
contract and the wage contracts that would be optimal if the ﬁrm-speciﬁcs h o c k s
were known at the time the contract was written. The dashed-dotted line depicts
the optimal wage with a low ﬁrm-speciﬁcd e m a n ds h o c k ,zl
i =0 .8,a n dt h ed a s h e d
line depicts the wage with a high ﬁrm-speciﬁcs h o c k ,zh
i =1 .2. Uncertainty about
the outcome of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc shock, and hence also about future employment,
results in a smooth wage between the two cases. The same tendency to smooth
the wage is evident in ﬁgure 4. Thus, the optimal wage increases for all levels of
aggregate demand.
To gain further insights into the forces at work it is instructive to depict
the ratio of Ωindex and Ωfix for every m ∈ M. Figure 6 shows that the objective
function is lower when the wage is constant. Obviously, a constant wage increases
the probability of being laid oﬀ and the consequence is that, for every m ∈ M,
Ωindex
Ωfix > 1. For intermediate levels of aggregate demand (0.8 <m<1.2) the
ratio is closer to one. This is the relevant interval since the shocks lie within this
23interval more than 95 percent of the time (σm =0 .05).
Aggregate Demand and Firm-Speciﬁc Productivity Shocks
It is easy to see from the ﬁrst order condition (10), that ﬁrm-speciﬁcd e m a n d
and supply shocks give exactly the same gain from indexation if the price elasticity
is equal to −2. Consequently, in this particular case the analysis from the previous
subsection applies for supply shocks as well. Compared with the eﬀects of demand
shocks, supply shocks generally interact with the price elasticity, which makes the
analysis slightly more involved. For low levels of η variations in θi bring about
high variability in production. Therefore indexation is more attractive the lower
is the price elasticity.
Figure 7 depicts the optimal wage contract, employment and proﬁtw h e n
σθi =0 .2 and η = −2.1.29 For these parameter values the decrease in income
that would give the same loss in indirect expected utility as the introduction of
a constant wage is 1.81 percent.30
4 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section I will take a closer look at the gain from indexation for a range of
parameter values. I begin by generalizing the preferences of the worker and the
29In this subsection σzi is set equal to 0.
30The corresponding cost of indexation with ﬁrm-speciﬁc demand shocks and a price elasticity
equal to 2.1 is approximately 0.004 percentage points greater than the baseline case. Hence,
the resulting cost of indexation is approximatively equal to the cost reported in table 1.
24entrepreneur by allowing for varying degrees of risk aversion. A natural question
is to what extent these results in turn are sensitive to changes in the rest of the
parameters. Hence, I continue by changing one parameter at a time while keeping
the rest at their baseline values.
Risk Aversion
Table 2 shows the gain from indexation for ρ ∈ {−2,−3,−4,−5} and for
γ ∈ {−1,−2,−3}. The gain from indexation to demand increases with the risk
aversion of the worker. This contradicts Gottfries (1992), who shows that the gain
from indexation decreases with the risk aversion of the worker. The diﬀerence
is due to the risk of being laid oﬀ, which is disregarded in Gottfries (1992). An
increase in the risk aversion of the worker decreases the utility of being laid
oﬀ. This can be seen by studying the last term in equation (10). This decrease
naturally makes the workers worry more about the possibility of being laid oﬀ.
The workers will, consequently, agree to make the wage more sensitive to changes
in aggregate demand in order to reduce layoﬀs in bad states. Hence, the gain
from indexation will be higher if the workers become more risk averse.
T h em o r er i s ka v e r s et h eﬁrm is the less willing is the ﬁrm to provide insurance
against wage ﬂuctuations. Hence, the gain from indexation increases with γ. The
gain from indexation is all in all relatively high, ranging from 1.5 to 3.6 percent
of the wage.
25Standard Deviation of the Firm-Speciﬁc Demand Shocks
Table 3 shows the gain from indexation for the same values of relative risk
aversion as table 2 but with only aggregate demand shocks. The size of the
gain from indexation is now more in line with the values reported by Gottfries
(1992).31 The direction of the change in the gain from indexation is qualitatively
diﬀerent from table 2. The gain from indexation decreases with the risk aversion
of the worker but increases with the risk aversion of the ﬁrm.
The idiosyncratic standard deviation of of plant-level growth rates in employ-
ment, depicted in ﬁgure 2, is probably to a fairly large extent driven by plants
that enter or exit. This is evident from the shape of the distribution of plant-level
growth rates in employment.32 In order to focus more on ongoing ﬁrms I have
computed the gain from indexation for a lower idiosyncratic standard deviation.
Table 4 depicts the gain when σzi =0 .1. The pattern from Table 2 is evident
also in Table 4, i.e. the gain from indexation increases with the risk aversion of
both the worker and the ﬁrm. The gain is however much lower, ranging from 0.1
to 0.3 percent of the wage. Clearly, the degree of ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty must
be relatively high for a constant wage to be much worse than a state-contingent
wage.
31G o t t f r i e s( 1 9 9 2 )s h o w st h a tt h eg a i ni sl e s st h a n0.1 percent of the wage when the risk
aversion of the ﬁrm is below −6.
32See e.g. Davis et al. (1997).
26Price Elasticity
Table 5 displays the gain from indexation when the price elasticity of demand,
η,i se q u a lt o−3. This generalization increases the gain from indexation slightly.
It also makes the gain less sensitive to changes in the relative risk aversion of the
ﬁrm. The intuition is that a higher price elasticity makes employment, the em-
ployment probability, ϕ,a n dp r o ﬁt more sensitive to changes in the wage. Hence,
changes in the wage becomes relatively more costly and the gain from indexa-
tion increases consequently. The optimal state contingent contract is depicted in
ﬁgure 8.
Quit Rate
A decrease in the quit rate, s, (increase in n)a ﬀects the employment probabil-
ity, ϕ, directly. This generalization is displayed in table 6. If the quit rate is small
then a smaller part of adjustments of the labor force can be made by variations
in hiring. Hence, variation in employment aﬀects the insiders more when the quit
rate is low. Consequently, the gain from indexation increases when the quit rate
decreases. Figure 9 depicts the corresponding wage contract, employment and
proﬁt. It is similar to ﬁgure 4. The relative bargaining power is smaller which
indicates that the risk of being laid oﬀ has increased.33
33If the risk of being laid oﬀ is substantial, workers would agree to lower lower their wages and
thus increase production. Employment must however fulﬁl the steady state condition E [`]=1
which in turn implies a lower φ.
27Unemployment Compensation
Table 7 displays the gain from indexation when unemployment beneﬁt, b,i s
equal to 0.8. If the cost of unemployment is lower one should expect a lower
gain from indexation. This is, indeed, the case. The gain from indexation is
reduced substantially compared with the baseline case in table 2.T h ed i ﬀerence
is especially palpable for high degrees of risk aversion. The gain from indexation,
when the risk of being laid oﬀ is low, seems to be more sensitive to changes in the
risk aversion of the ﬁrm than of the risk aversion of the worker. Figure 10 shows
why the gain from indexation is lower for higher levels of unemployment beneﬁts.
The reason for a higher wage in less favourable states is simply that the outside
option is not as bad as with a lower b. One problem with assigning a value to
unemployment beneﬁt si sw h e t h e rt or e l yo nt h em o m e n t a r y( d i s ) u t i l i t yo fj o b
loss or whether to take dynamic aspects into account. The model is clearly not
dynamic, but if we want to capture some form of discounted utility of job loss we
should assign a slightly higher value than what the replacement rates indicate.
Unemployment beneﬁte q u a lt o0.8 should, in view of this, be more appropriate.34
Standard Deviation of the Aggregate Demand Shocks
I will end the sensitivity analysis of demand shocks by assigning a higher
standard deviation to the aggregate demand shocks. The intuition behind this
generalization is equivalent to assigning a lower quit rate, s. If the aggregate
34If the expected duration of unemployment is one third of a year we would have b = 1
3 ·





28demand shocks are suﬃciently limited all of the employment adjustments can be
made by variations in hiring. Hence, insiders experience a higher degree of job
security and the gain from indexation is consequently lower. Table 8 depicts the
gain from indexation when σm =0 .1.
Variance Decomposition
In this subsection I will increase the aggregate uncertainty to the level that
corresponds to the uncertainty that equals the total uncertainty in the baseline
case. This is done in order to investigate whether the increase in the gain from
indexation, c, only follows from the fact that the overall variance in the economy
has increased when we introduced ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty. The overall uncer-
t a i n t yi nt h eb a s e l i n ec a s es t e m sf r o mt w os o u r c e s ;ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty, σxi,
equal to 0.2 and aggregate uncertainty, σm,e q u a lt o0.05. The total variance
is given by σ2
tot = σ2
xi + σ2
m + cov(xi,m) which equals 0.0625 since the shocks
are independent. Table 9 depicts the gain from indexation when σm =0 .25 and
σxi =0 . The gain is far greater than what was the case in table 2.T h ed i ﬀerence
is due to the fact that it is very costly to abstain from indexation when it is pos-
sible to be completely insured against it. Thus, it is very unlikely that a contract
that stipulates a ﬁxed nominal wage is an equilibrium if the total uncertainty is
as great as speciﬁed above, and when it is possible to completely insure against
it.
As shown above, the gain from indexation is substantially lower when we
29cannot make contracts contingent on ﬁrm-speciﬁcs h o c k s .
Risk Aversion - Firm-Speciﬁc Productivity Shocks
Table 10 depicts the gain from indexation for diﬀerent degrees of risk aversion
for the ﬁrm and the worker with ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity shocks, σθi =0 .2.T h e
gain exhibit the same general characteristics as the gain in table 2, but is about
20 percent higher, ranging from 1.81 to 4.2 percent of the wage.
5 Summary and Concluding Remarks
The common view of business cycles is that expansions and contractions in eco-
nomic activity are driven by positive and negative shocks that aﬀect all or most
of the ﬁrms symmetrically at the same time. The result of these aggregate shocks
is widespread ﬂuctuations in employment and production. This has also been the
prevailing view in the implicit contract theory of real wages and employment for-
malized by Azariadis (1975) and Baily (1974) and extended by Gottfries (1992).
The basic insight underlying this theory is that ﬁrms, who are assumed to be less
risk averse than workers, may be in a position to insure the workers against em-
ployment ﬂuctuations by stabilizing the wage. Hence, these studies have tried to
explain wage rigidity in the face of employment ﬂuctuations caused by aggregate
shocks.
The assumption that aggregate shocks is the main determinant of employment
ﬂuctuations seems hard to reconcile with the recent literature on job creation and
30job destruction. Microeconomic evidence from most OECD countries shows that
job creation and job destruction occur simultaneously at all phases of the business
cycle and that a large part of establishments’ employment experiences seems to
be explained by idiosyncratic or ﬁrm-speciﬁc sources of uncertainty.
In this paper we take this criticism seriously by addressing the neglected issue
of how ﬁrm-speciﬁcs h o c k sa ﬀect the gain from writing state contingent wage
contract. The very nature of ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks seems to be such that it is very
hard to make wages or employment contingent on them. Hence, I assume that
these ﬁrm-speciﬁc sources of uncertainty cannot be written into the contract, due
to diﬀerent transactions costs.
By numerically solving an insider-outsider model developed by Gottfries (1992)
I ﬁrst show that the introduction of ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty increases the gain
from indexation considerably (from 0 to 1.5 percent of the wage). The increase
is more pronounced for ﬁrm-speciﬁc supply shocks. It is not evident that the
gain from indexation is small enough to support an equilibrium with a constant
nominal wage. The second result is that nominal wage contracts should be more
prevalent, when layoﬀ is not so costly for the worker, e.g. due to high unemploy-
ment beneﬁts or short duration of unemployment spells.
One caveat with the analysis put forward in this paper that ought to be
mentioned is that when contracts are incomplete the contracting parties may
introduce other forms of contracts that can be used as substitutes for complete
contracts. One way of doing this is to introduce the possibility of renegotiation
31as new information becomes available. At law, any contract may be renegotiated
provided both parties agree. If it is possible to make the contract completely
contingent on the state of the world, which is the case if σxi =0 , there is no
economic rationale for any ex post renegotiation because no new information
comes in. The introduction of ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks that cannot be written into the
contract makes the contract incomplete and vulnerable to renegotiation. Hence,
it would be interesting to explore the eﬀects of renegotiation on the gain from
indexation when ﬁrm’s employment experiences can be explained by aggregate
and ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty. This extension is however left for future research.
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There exists a wide range of methods for solving nonlinear equations like (10).
The numerical task is to ﬁnd, for each m ∈ M, the zero of (10).35 To do this
I choose the secant method. In essence the secant method reduces a nonlinear
problem to a sequence of linear problems. Formally the secant method is a
simple iteration which proceeds as follows. Start by guessing a wage wk. Second,
construct the linear approximation to Λ (equation 10) at wk. This yields the
function g (w) ≡ Λ(wk)+
Λ(wk)−Λ(wk−1)
(wk−wk−1) (wk+1 − wk). The functions g (w) and
Λ(w) are tangent at wk. This means that we now, instead of solving for a zero
of Λ, can solve for a zero of g.S e tg equal to 0 and solve for wk+1,t oﬁnd our
new guess of w. This results in the iteration




Continue this iteration until (15) holds approximately up to some accuracy
parameter. One diﬃculty in this procedure is that we for every guess of w have
to numerically evaluate the integral in (10). We will not go through the details of
the theory behind numerical integration (quadrature) routines, see Judd (1998)
35If f : Rn → Rn, then a zero of f is any w such that f (w)=0 ,a n daﬁxed point of f is
any w such that f (w)=w.
37for an exposition. Here we just note that GAUSS (and other similar computer
programs) has a selection of routines which allow us to evaluate the integral in
(10). I used the routine INTQUAD1 (and INTQUAD2 for double integrals) in







where ωj and zij are Gauss-Legendre weights and nodes. The order of in-
tegration was set to 40.36 The integral is evaluated between a =5 σ2
zi +¯ zi and
b = −5σ2
zi +¯ zi,w h e r eσ2
zi and ¯ zi is the variance and the mean of the idiosyncratic
demand shock. The idiosyncratic demand shocks are assumed to be normally
distributed.
36The results does not signiﬁcantly change if I instead use 24 or 32 as the order of integration.
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  Figure 2   Standard deviation of idiosyncratic growth rates in employment,  
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Quits  Contract  m, θ i, zi  hire  , set pi,  qi  Goods markets open.   Figure 3  Indexed wage contract, employment and profit. Only aggregate shocks.  
 
  Figure 4  Indexed wage contract, employment and profit. Aggregate and  
    firm-specific demand shocks. 
   Figure 5  Firm-specific shocks can only take two values 0.8 and 1.2.  
 
  Figure 6  Ratio of indirect expected utility under a indexed and a fixed wage  
    (contingent on aggregate demand)  
   Figure 7  Indexed wage contract, employment and profit. Aggregate demand and  
    firm-specific productivity shocks. 
 
  Figure 8  Indexed wage contract, employment and profit. Aggregate and  
    firm-specific demand shocks. η  = -3.  
   Figure 9  Indexed wage contract, employment and profit. Aggregate and  
    firm-specific demand shocks. n = 0.9.  
 
  Figure 10  Indexed wage contract, employment and profit. Aggregate and  
  firm-specific demand shocks. b = 0.8.  
 Table 2
Gain from indexation ( c )
ρ
γ -2 -3 -4 -5
-1 0.015 0.019 0.026 0.034
-2 0.016 0.020 0.026 0.035
-3  0.021 0.027 0.036
Note - The table shows the cost that would give the same loss in expected utility as the introduction of a constant 
nominal wage. The standard deviation of the aggregate demand shock (σ m) is 5 percent. I assume that ρ =≤ =γ .
Table 3
σ z = 0 Gain from indexation ( c )
ρ
γ -2 -3 -4 -5
- 1 0000
-2 0.00060 0.00042 0.00031 0.00025
-3  0.00127 0.00101 0.00084
Note - See note to table 1.
Table 4
σ z = 0.10 Gain from indexation ( c )
ρ
γ -2 -3 -4 -5
-1 0.00116 0.00152 0.00207 0.00300
-2 0.00182 0.00200 0.00245 0.00320
-3  0.00282 0.00320 0.00380
Note - See note to table 1.Table 5
η  = -3 Gain from indexation ( c )
ρ
γ -2 -3 -4 -5
-1 0.015 0.020 0.026 0.035
-2 0.016 0.020 0.027 0.036
-3  0.021 0.027 0.036
Note - See note to table 1.
Table 6
n = 0.9 Gain from indexation ( c )
ρ
γ -2 -3 -4 -5
-1 0.0297 0.0385 0.0501 0.0650
-2 0.0301 0.0387 0.0502 0.0650
-3  0.0391 0.0504 0.0651
Note - See note to table 1.
Table 7
b = 0.8 Gain from indexation ( c )
ρ
γ -2 -3 -4 -5
-1 0.0055 0.0061 0.0069 0.0078
-2 0.0063 0.0067 0.0073 0.0081
-3  0.0075 0.0080 0.0087
Note - See note to table 1.Table 8
σ m = 0.1,  σ z = 0.2 Gain from indexation ( c )
ρ
γ -2 -3 -4 -5
-1 0.018 0.023 0.030 0.041
-2 0.020 0.025 0.032 0.042
-3  0.028 0.034 0.043
Note - See note to table 1. (valid except for σ m = 0.05)
Table 9
σ m = 0.25,  σ z = 0 Gain from indexation ( c )
ρ
γ -2 -3 -4 -5
-1 0.226 0.161 0.151 0.166
-2 0.298 0.208 0.186 0.192
-3  0.324 0.273 0.258
Note - See note to table 1. (valid except for σ m = 0.05)
Table 10
σ θ  = 0.2, σ z = 0, η  = 2.1 Gain from indexation ( c )
ρ
γ -2 -3 -4 -5
-1 0.0181 0.0237 0.0313 0.0417
-2 0.0185 0.0240 0.0316 0.0418
-3  0.0245 0.0319 0.0420
Note - See note to table 1. 